ABSTRACT Collective memories of totalitarianism and the industrialized slaughter of the Holocaust have exerted a profound influence on postwar European politics and philosophy. Two of the most prominent political theorists and public intellectuals to take up the legacy of total war are Hannah Arendt and JŸrgen Habermas. However, their prescriptions seem to pull in opposite directions. While Arendt draws on remembrance to recover politics on a smaller scale, advocating for the creation of local councils, Habermas draws on the past to justify his search for postnational forms of political community that can overcome the bloody legacy of nationalism. My argument brings these two perspectives together by examining their mutual support for European integration as a way of preserving the lessons of total war. I argue that both Habermas and Arendt reject the technocratic nature of the EU while maintaining hope that it can develop a truly supranational form of politics.
The Second World WarÉ[is] a war we forget at our own peril. Anyone who thinks that fascism in one guise
or another is dead and gone ought to think again.
-Judith Shklar (1998: 4) .
Introduction
Collective memories of EuropeÕs Òage of total warÓ (Black, 2006) Ð spanning two global conflicts, the economic hardship of the Great Depression, the rise of totalitarianism and the industrialized slaughter of the Holocaust Ð defined European politics and society in the postwar era . The unprecedented record of death and destruction in the first half of the twentieth century has been the dominant imperative for change since the end of the Second World War. This motivation has been a particularly powerful force in global affairs, as anti-fascism defined domestic and international politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War (see Lebow et al., 2006) .
The most notable product of this political agenda from the perspective of international political theory is the project of European integration. From its humble beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union (EU) has become the greatest experiment in political, social, economic and monetary integration Òbeyond the nation-stateÓ (Haas, 1964) . As such, it raises fundamental questions about many of the basic concepts of politics and international relations, including nationalism, citizenship, sovereignty and democracy (see Verovšek, 2017a: 398) .
Despite its ongoing crises at the beginning of the second millennium, looking back on the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, a Òunited EuropeÓ has indeed proven Òindispensable to the preservation of peaceÓ by helping overcome the Òage old opposition between France and GermanyÓ (Committee on Institutional Affairs, 1982: 47) .
The postwar imperative for change cannot, of course, reconcile the atrocities of the past once and for all. In the words of Max Horkheimer, ÒPast injustice has occurred and is completed. The slain are really slainÓ (in Benjamin, 1999: 471) and cannot be brought back to life. While those killed by totalitarianism cannot be redeemed, the survivors of past on the European continent have sought to give these deaths meaning by drawing on their memories of the past to prevent the recurrence of such events in the future.
Although World War II left painful and divisive memories across Europe, this historical legacy is especially powerful in the Federal Republic. The intellectual challenge of the Holocaust for GermanyÕs relationship to its cultural tradition is perhaps most symbolically obvious in Buchenwald. In the middle of this concentration camp (Konzentrationslager), where many Jews, Poles, Slavs and other Òsocial degeneratesÓ had labored and died, stood the famous ÒGoethe OakÓ (Goethe-Eiche), where Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe wrote the ÒWandererÕs NightsongÓ (Wanderers Nachtlied) and parts of Faust. However, this legacy was tarnished by the fact that the Nazis used the oak for torture and hangings before it was destroyed by an allied bomb in 1944 (HŠftling Nr.
[Prisoner #4935], 2006).
This example is emblematic of the postwar German struggle to approach its past.
Hannah Arendt and JŸrgen Habermas stand out as two of the most prominent public intellectuals to take up this problem and its political implications. Although ArendtÕs (2006) condemnation of Adolf Eichmann for overseeing the deportation of the Jews by the Nazis is her most (in)famous intervention in these debates, she also took strong positions on the issue of GermanyÕs collective guilt and responsibility (see Alweiss, 2003: 307-18) , as well as on the important role that history plays in constructing the common world that all individuals share. Similarly, the meaning of the past has been a constant theme in all of HabermasÕs writings, culminating in his defense of the HolocaustÕs central place in postwar German identity during the Historikerstreit (HistoriansÕ Debate) of the mid-1980s (see Baldwin, 1990; Habermas, 1989) .
There is much that unites the views of these two theorists regarding the role that this unmastered Ð or perhaps even unmasterable (Maier, 1988) Ð past ought to play in postwar social and political life. For instance, even though Arendt tends to speak of remembrance while Habermas uses the term collective memory (which he adopts from the French social theorist Maurice Halbwachs), both are committed to social contestation through dialogue as a way of recovering and learning from the experienced past. 1 Arendt and Habermas also agree that shared historical imaginaries are crucial in linking disparate individuals together within the common, globalized world world that has developed with the onset of modernity and the technological revolutions it has brought with it (see Marcuse, 1977) .
However, in addition to these similarities there are a number of substantive differences between their positions as well. Most notably, unlike Arendt, whose theoretical ideals are drawn from her analysis of the Greek city-state Ð prompting one unsympathetic commentator to accuse her of Òpolis envyÓ (Wolin, 2001 In mobilizing support for the postwar European movement, Arendt and Habermas both frame the problem of dealing with the Nazi past not only as one of German intellectual history, but also as a key issue for international political theory in the wake of total war. However, whereas Habermas focuses almost exclusive on the legacy of the Holocaust, Arendt tends to speak of the remembrance of totalitarianism more broadly. At a time when divisions between the ÒoldÓ founding states and the Ònew,Ó postcommunist members from East-Central Europe is increasingly dividing the EU (see Verovšek, 2015: 542-6), I conclude by suggesting that ArendtÕs more holistic vision, which allows for memories of both fascism and communism to drive the projet europŽen, may have certain advantages.
The argument is organized as follows. In the first section, I demonstrate the importance of remembrance in ArendtÕs theoretical system, focusing in particular on the influence of the polis and the importance of storytelling (see also Verovšek 2014b). Even though the concentration camp symbolizes the danger of the loss of memory, Arendt does not focus exclusively on its application by the Nazis in the west, but also on its deployment by the communist regimes of the east. In part two I then show why Habermas thinks that the memories of World War II Ð contained in the paradigmatic example of Auschwitz Ð should form the basis for a federated, supranational community that exists both above and alongside existing European states.
In the third section I bring these reflections together by examining how these two seemingly opposed perspectives can be brought together. Insodoing, I highlight their surprising agreement on the potential of the Ònew regionalismÓ (Tel˜, 2001) belonging Ð as well as of the legacy of totalitarianism more generally Ð on both a personal and a theoretical level (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 115-63) . Her memories of the Third Reich caused her to question much of the history of political thought, which she argued was tainted by the events of . As a political theorist Ð not a political philosopher, a label she rejected due to its connection with the philosophical tradition Ð she sought a new grounding for politics in the postwar world.
Arendt builds her conception of the political on a reinterpretation of the Greek polis (city-state) as the first site of politics, understood literally as referring to Òthe affairs of the polis.Ó She argues that rethinking the concepts of ancient philosophy is crucial in a world that has experienced totalitarianism. Revisiting the past with new eyes has the potential to dismiss Òthe mindless peace of complacencyÓ (Arendt, 1977a: 38) that made the radical but simultaneously banal, bureaucratized evil of Nazism possible.
Based on her reconstruction of ancient Greek political thought, Arendt argues that Òwords and deedsÓ are the key feature of Òthe human condition,Ó the title of her major theoretical work on politics. Words and deeds are crucial because distinguish individuals both from each other and from the rest of the living world: ÒIn acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal[ing] actively their unique personal identitiesÓ (Arendt, 1998: 179) . Although everybody labors to take care of their physical needs and works to produce tools and other artifacts, the separation of unique individuals from the masses of human beings is possible only as a result of Òwords and deeds,Ó action in ArendtÕs terminology. Through Òaction in concertÓ individuals cease to be defined by work or labor, and become political beings, living and defining themselves vis-ˆ-vis others.
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The importance of words and deeds in the creation of unique identities highlights the crucial role of storytelling in preserving these markers of individuality beyond those that witnessed them directly. On one level, storytelling is necessary to spread the effects of action horizontally throughout the entire community. On a deeper level, however, it is the function of history to take words and deeds out of the recurring cycle of the natural world in order to preserve these achievements for posterity. Storytelling makes memory tangible and reveals the meaning of the past. However, it remains dependent on the presence of others. Political communities, where individuals live together and pursue common goals as citizens, therefore assume a central role in preserving the past and endowing it with meaning.
Arendt argues that it is only through the shared human capacity for speech that individuals are able to build common worlds together. Words and deeds transform a group into a communitas, a Òunion with.Ó This unity of individuals bound together by a common fellow feeling is the basis for political life. She traces the creation of the political realm back to the Greek city-state. Arendt (1998: 194-5) notes, ÒBefore men began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place, the space being the public realm of the polis.Ó
The polis and other political communities serve the dual function of making remembrance possible in the present and of reifying these memories into more permanent, tangible structures. They create a safe haven for individuals that protects them from both internal and external violence; they provide a stable home for action. By ensuring the safety of its members, the polity guarantees that witnesses will be present to testify to the great words and deeds of unique individuals. In this way, ÒThe polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win Ôimmortal fame,Õ that is, to multiply the chances for everyone to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctnessÓ (Arendt, 1998: 197) .
The community not only provides witnesses; it also Òfabricates memoryÓ (Arendt, 1977b : 64) so words and deeds can outlive their authors and the original witnesses. Its laws and institutions concretize past acts and make them immortal: ÒWhat saves the affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this incessant talk about them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of itÓ (Arendt, 1990: 220) .
The polis is the structure that provides these guideposts; it creates what Arendt calls Òthe common worldÓ that gives action meaning. In both its physical structure and its political legacy Ð reflected in laws, statutes and records Ð the polity Òis a kind of organized remembranceÓ (Arendt, 1998: 198) .
Through storytelling and political communities such as the polis, men assure that their great words and deeds do not die. By reifying memory into concrete, tangible objects that range from physical monuments and memorials to words on a page, the storyteller and the community give acts a durability that is not possible otherwise. While those outside the polis depend on poets to gain immortality, the political community guarantees that action will endure without depending on bards to sing and listeners to hear the stories chronicling their deeds. Although storytelling is a powerful ability, the narrative and the memories it preserves would not have the same longevity without the ultimate Òsitus of memoryÓ (Kohn, 2000: 125) , the polis.
What Arendt found most frightening about the rise of totalitarianism in both its communist and its fascist variants is its embrace of a conception of society where everyone is unified into a single body politic that thinks and acts as one (Lederman, 2016) . The plurality of unique persons living within a given territory is reduced to one man, das Volk (Òthe people,Ó a singular noun in German), i.e. the individual is subsumed within the corporate state. In order to achieve this goal, Arendt argues that totalitarianism seeks to destroy the preconditions of action: plurality and Òthe gift of memory so dangerous to totalitarian ruleÓ (1951: 434) . In contrast to the Òwords and deedsÓ of the polis, the administrative approach adopted by totalitarianism Òsubstitutes for the boundaries and channels of communication between individual men a band of iron which holds them so tightly together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One man of gigantic dimensionsÓ (Arendt, 1951: 465-6) . The spontaneity of human action is replaced by mechanistic conceptions of nature and history.
The attempts of the totalitarian state to eliminate plurality, memory and action is most visible in the operations of the extermination or death camps (Vernichtungslager).
These institutions are unprecedented because they not only try to rid the world of certain individuals and classes within society, but do so in a way that Òmiraculously sees to it that the victim never existed at allÓ (Arendt, 1951: 434-5) . In order to do so, the camps This approach is not restricted to the West or to the Nazi regime. On the contrary, it is shared by totalitarianism in both its fascist and its communist forms. The Soviet gulag thus serves the same purpose as the Nazi concentration camp, both of which sought to take advantage of anonymous inmates as sources of inexpensive labor power, while also sharing some features of the death camps. Most notably, all of these totalitarian institutions seek to destroy individuality, making the victim disappear both as a physical body on the earth and from the memories of others in the shared human world. Much like purged members of the Communist Party who later disappeared from photographs under Stalin, the victim seems never to have existed at all. In The Origins of Totalitarianism
Arendt quotes two victims of the Great Purge in the Soviet Union, who report that Òif it is true that elephants never forget, Russians seem to us to be the very opposite of elephantsÉ. Soviet Russian psychology seems to make forgetfulness really possibleÓ (in Beck and Godin, 1951: 234, 127 ).
Building on Arendt, Timothy Snyder (2016) (Arendt, 1951: 452) . In contrast to the Òorganized remembranceÓ of the political community, totalitarianism seeks Òorganized oblivion.Ó Despite ArendtÕs status as the Òthinker of the polisÓ (Sternberger, 1980) , Christian Volk (2017: 172) points out that in addition to this theoretical resource, her thought also draws on her memories of Òthe downfall of a European order based on the nation-state, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of National Socialism.Ó In order to respond to the horrors of totalitarianism, Arendt had to find a way to reassert plurality.
However, she could not do so without Òthe saving power of remembrance, which helps us preserve what would otherwise be lost to timeÓ (Beiner, 1982: 155) . Although words and deeds lie at the root of human existence, they would be meaningless and futile without the gift of memory. If people could not preserve their past interactions with other human beings, they would be doomed to appear in the world for a fleeting moment, only to disappear again in a never-ending cycle. Individuals would have neither a past nor a future: ÒWithout remembranceÉthe living activities of action, speech, and thought would lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear as though they never had beenÓ (Arendt, 1998: 95) .
However, while Arendt needed to find a way to reassert memory, in the aftermath of the crimes of totalitarianism and the atrocities of the Holocaust she also knew that it was impossible to simply go back to the status quo ante. As a result, Arendt interpreted totalitarianism and the events of the late 1930s and early 1940s as a crucial break in history that made a simplistic reliance on time-honored forms of authority untenable.
Unlike some survivors, who sought relief from the horrors of the past in forgetting,
Arendt maintains a belief in the importance remembrance and the dangers of oblivion (see Benhabib, 2003: 91) . Even though Òwe have ceased to live in a common world where the words we have in common possess an unquestionable meaningfulnessÓ (Arendt, 1977b: 95) , she argues that this does not mean that the past is no longer important or that there is no long any meaning to be found in history. On the contrary, Arendt repeatedly warns of the dangers of destroying memory.
Arendt argues that preserving Òthe pre-existence of a common worldÓ (1998: 465) through remembrance is crucial not only for the formal legal communities of the modern state system, but also for the creation of a broader sense of community that encompasses the entire globe. Although the progress of natural science has resulted in Òthe decisive shrinkage of the earth,Ó Arendt worries that these gains have been won at Òthe price of putting a decisive distance between man and earth, of alienating man from his immediate earthly surroundingsÓ (Arendt, 1998: 251) . This alienation from the physical earth itself is dangerous in an age when humanity has the ability to destroy its environment both through the use of the atom bomb and environmental destruction on a global scale. In
ArendtÕs analysis this Òearth alienationÓ is accompanied by a Òworld alienationÓ of individuals from each other. Thus, instead of becoming Òcitizens of the worldÓ who can confront global problems, Òthe eclipse of the common worldÓ has instead led to Òthe formation of the lonely mass manÓ incapable of action to preserve either the common world of the common earth (Arendt, 1998: 257) .
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In order to combat these trends Ð which both helped to produce totalitarianism and were exacerbated by it Ð Arendt maintains that individuals re-establishing bonds that cut across social and generational boundaries. Instead of leaving the past behind, she encouraged the survivors of EuropeÕs age of total war to rethink the relationship between the past and the present. While the past usually limits the range of possible plotlines, during moments of crisis memory can also provide the resources needed to think political action anew (see Verovšek, 2020 ).
This approach builds on ArendtÕs reading of Walter Benjamin. 4 In his ÒTheses on the Philosophy of HistoryÓ (1940), Benjamin argues that violent historical ruptures destroy existing narrative, leaving only fragments of the past behind. Arendt builds on this point, arguing that the aftermath of ÒBenjaminian momentsÓ (Benhabib, 2012: 31-3) of crisis that tear the existing narratives of history asunder, the survivors must imitate the actions of a pearl diver, who searches the depths for bits of the past that have (Arendt, 1970: 41) Ð an ability made possible by the power of words to convince individuals to cooperate of their own free will.
This fragmentary, Òpearl-divingÓ methodology necessitated by the experience of totalitarianism leads her to argue in favor of a new localized politics in the form of a council system, which was until recently Òa relatively neglected theme in the scholarly literature on ArendtÓ (Lederman, 2016: 504) . She is highly critical of the liberal- In all of these cases, Arendt argues that local councils Òconcerned with the reorganization of the political and economic life of the country and the establishment of a new world orderÓ were not planned, but instead Òsprang from the people as spontaneous organs of action and of orderÓ (Arendt, 1990: 263) . Although the dominance of the Party or of the party system inevitably doomed these local institutions, they are ÒpearlsÓ with the potential to create a new mode of networked politics. These small Òspaces of freedom,Ó in which every citizen is able to take part, have the potential preserve politics and action in communities larger than the polis, at least in principle.
The fact that revolutionary councils were best preserved in AmericaÕs federal system of self-government explains why the US remained a beacon of hope for Arendt throughout her life (see Arendt, 1990: 156-70 that political power is not drawn from force or violence, but is a product of our ability to speak and persuade each other Ð our Òability not just to act but to act in concertÓ (Arendt, 1970: 41) . However, he (Habermas, 1983: 178) HabermasÕ core philosophical insight is that the essential feature of language is communication, which raises us out of nature and makes us conscious moral agents. This is the basis of social interaction. Language as Òcommunicative actionÓ cannot only be used objectively to refer to states of the world and subjectively to reflect personal experiences, but also intersubjectively to establish mutual understanding and interpersonal relationships between individuals. The ultimate arbiter of the validity of these claims is the ability of the participants to defend their claims with reasons, i.e. Òin terms of the capacity of responsible participants in interaction to orient themselves in relation to validity claims geared to intersubjective recognitionÓ (Habermas, 1987: 314) .
The space and reach of this communicative politics is not limited as in Arendt, nor is it as agonistic and rhetorical. Instead, Habermas (1995: 129) argues for a Òshifting boundary between the private and public spheresÓ legitimized by discourse within the political community.
By framing his social theory in universal terms, Habermas retains the ability Ð indeed the responsibility Ð of combating relativism. Grounding a substantive, noninstrumental form reason in universal rules of discourse allows Habermas to criticize and struggle against totalitarian policies and authoritarian forms of government, which restrict intersubjective action and argumentation. Since arguments are deployed to persuade others, speakers inevitably are forced to tacitly acknowledge that these norms are valid for everyone. Communicative action, the discursive process of criticizing and giving reasons for particular claims, can lead rational individuals to universal norms. Instead of the friends and enemies created in EuropeÕs experience of total war (see Schmitt, 2007) ,
HabermasÕs Òtalk centricÓ rather than Òvote centricÓ (Scudder, 2016: 524) The ability of participants in discourse to come to Òmutual understandingÓ (VerstŠndigung) about their goals and desires is crucial for any political community. It is this ability and the shared Òwe-perspectiveÓ it encourages that allows individuals form communities bound by ties of solidarity, without which Òintelligent action [remains] permanently foundationless and inconsequentialÓ (Habermas, 1994: 96) . Traditionally, these ties dissipated fairly quickly, not extending much beyond the village or the polis.
With the advent of nationalism in the nineteenth century, combined with the empowering of the state through railroads and schools, however, nation-states were able to extend the circle of solidarity to include their co-nationals, who shared linguistic, cultural and historical bonds (see Weber, 1976) . The creation of the demos was thus requires the creation of a Òstate-constituting peopleÓ (Habermas, 2006b: 305) , a process that is achieved in large part through the narratives of collective memory that are contained within Òstories of peoplehoodÓ (Smith, 2003) . In this way Ð much like Arendt Ð
Habermas also seeks to link his communicative theory of politics to the remembrance of a concrete political community.
While extending the ties of solidarity to the state certainly had its advantages, it is also exclusionary and dangerous. Habermas (1998: 142) observes, ÒThe formation of nation-states under the banner of ethnonationalism has almost always been accompanied by bloody purification rituals.Ó A brief glance at the history of European nationalism before 1945 shows how the desire for ethnic purity resulted in repeated rounds of forced emigration, expulsion, disenfranchisement and extermination culminating in genocide. Arendt (1951: ch. 9) argues that the existence of stateless persons, refugees, and those deprived of their Òright to have rightsÓ is crucial to understanding the origins of totalitarianism in Europe. Habermas (1996: 508) agrees, noting that her diagnosis has Òproved frighteningly accurate.Ó Although he concurs with ArendtÕs analysis of the concentration camp as the key institution of totalitarianism, Habermas focuses almost exclusively on the crimes committed by the Nazis in the Holocaust (see Baldwin, 1990 (Habermas, 2001: 26-37 can be reformed and rebuilt by reflecting on Òthe better traditions of our history, a history that is not unexamined but instead appropriated criticallyÓ (Habermas, 1989: 234) . This 
This oversight in his application of his ideas, however, does not mean that
HabermasÕs argument is wrong. It just means that it is too narrowly applied. Although he agrees that more needs to be done to create a European identity strong enough to empower the EU, he sees clear signs of its existence in the world today. He notes, Ò[F]eatures of a common political mentality have taken shape, so that others often recognize us as Europeans, rather than as Germans or French Ð and that happens not just in Hong Kong, but even in Tel AvivÓ (Habermas, 2005: 9) . He identifies a number of markers of this nascent European identity, most importantly an aversion to the use of force and desire for multi-lateral diplomacy conducted through the United Nations. While this kind of identity would clearly be a construction, this is not a problem as long as Europeans themselves actively endorse it. The appropriation of the common experience of the horrors of nationalism is hardly arbitrary Ð on the contrary, it is completely necessary.
Despite the fact that Habermas focuses of the collective memories of Western
Europeans in constructing this argument, its implications are not limited to Europe.
Habermas contends that the legacy of violence and nationalism on this continent can serve as an example to the rest of the world. This explains his recent forays into international political theory (Lundestad and Kjartan, 2011) . Building on KantÕs famous essay ÒTowards Perpetual PeaceÓ (1795) Ð which is also a core touchstone for Arendt Ð Habermas (2006b: 503) argues for the creation of Òregionally comprehensive regimes like the European CommunityÓ around the world. By encouraging the creation of broad, non-nationalist identities, these continental regimes could help safeguard peace and prevent atrocities within their borders and externally by cooperating in peacekeeping and protecting human rights through the United Nations. This is the key step he takes using the memory of war and atrocity in Europe to push politics ÒupÓ beyond the traditional political boundaries of the Westphalian state. The EU does so Ð aspirationally at least Ð both institutionally and through the creation of a transnational European public sphere (Abbott, 2016) .
Compatible Forms of Postwar Global Federalism
Despite their broad agreements about communicative basis of politics, the importance of Òaction in concert,Ó the dangers of the nation-state, the threat of totalitarianism, and the importance of the collective memory of these historical events, Arendt and Habermas seem to draw conflicting lessons from the interwar crisis and the experience of two World Wars. Although both argue that the concrete experience of the concentration camp Ð contained either in the paradigmatic image of Auschwitz (Habermas) or within the broader phenomenon of totalitarianism (Arendt) Ð require a rethinking of political life, they move in opposite directions. In particular, Arendt mobilizes the memory of European history to move towards local politics, i.e. towards institutions, organizations and associations that promoted direct participation of the people and Òwhose units might be both horizontally and vertically connected, related to or dependent on one anotherÓ (Wellmer, 2000: 224) . By contrast, Habermas seeks to address the problems of world politics by placing the nation-state within regional Òcontinental regimes,Ó of which the EU is the example par excellence. He (Habermas, 2006a: 136) argues that regimes at this transnational, meso-level will be able to promote an Òactively rebalanced world orderÓ that would prevent the horrors of totalitarianism from recurring.
Despite these differences, I argue that it is possible to bring these divergent stands of thought together by examining the support both of these thinkers offer for the European project as part of a broader reorganization and reconceptualization of international politics in the wake of the Second World War. Although Habermas criticizes Arendt of over-ontologizing and of creating political categories that are too rigid, he does not take issue in principle with her call for more direct, inclusive forms of politics. On the contrary, he favors and encourages direct participation in democratic life through processes of deliberation. While he has argued that citizens can and should be involved in the governing of larger units, he would welcome a renewed, localized politics, as long as it was able to function meaningfully under conditions of globalization and was able to combat the disastrous consequences of nationalism.
HabermasÕs own proposals for a Òconstitutionalization of international lawÓ based on a Òdemocratically constituted world society without a world governmentÓ retain an important role for existing communities. This system depends on universal norms, which are determined at the global level through both formal international law and informal customary norms. However, formal enforcement is carried out by legitimate systems of coercion that are Òclosely linked in the historical form of the constitutional stateÓ (Habermas, 2008c: 445) . In many cases, these mechanisms are further devolved to local authorities, which decide which laws to enforce and how to institutionalize them (for more, see Verovšek, 2017b ).
In addition to taking advantage of local institutions, Habermas also seeks to build on the historical reservoirs of civic solidarity contained within existing polities. He fears that scrapping local politics in favor of a globalized system will leave individuals in a state of Durkheimian anomie where they lack the communal ties necessary for socialization and the development of meaningful identities. Without the social bonds created by politics at the community level, Habermas argues that citizens will loose the collective power to combat the rise of the powerful forces of the neoliberal economic system. His endorsement of the importance of local politics, even within an increasingly globalized and constitutionalized postnational constellation, already brings his thought closer to ArendtÕs.
In between these two levels, he (Habermas, 2008a: 324-5) argues that Òregional or continental regimesÓ can help to set institutional frameworks for norm implementation at the meso-level. These structures are meant to fill the political and legal gap between the local and the global. Since regions often share a historical experiences and other shared cultural markers, such continental regimes could ensure that global debates about the implementation of basic international norms were carried out in Òthe intermediate arena In contrast to Habermas, Arendt never set out an institutional design or structure for world federalism. In fact, she was notoriously suspicious of such frameworks, noting, ÒNobody can be a citizen of the world as he is a citizen of his countryÓ (Arendt, 1968: 81) . Given the emphasis she places on Òplurality, diversity and mutual limitations,Ó Arendt was also suspicious of attempts to globalize politics or to create an international public sphere. However, despite her wariness, Patricia Owens (2007: 146) points out, ÒA federated political structure more akin to KantÕs Ôrepublic of republicsÕ is certainly compatible with her views.Ó In fact, something along these lines might be precisely what she had in mind when she endorsed the Òframework of universal agreementsÓ (Arendt, 1968: 93) laid out in the writings of Karl Jaspers, her doctoral supervisor and friend.
ArendtÕs support of a loose global federalism is somewhat unexpected given her commitment to local politics. It is hard to draw firm conclusions about her thought on this topic, as she Ònever clearly and systematically set out her thought in this areaÓ (Owens, 2010: 73) . However, the fact that she felt compelled to move in this direction is understandable given the increasing globalization of a world in which humans walk on the moon and humanity has developed the ability to destroy itself. It may be that her moves towards a form of global federalism are an attempt to bring a much-needed dose of realism into the basic insights of her council model, which otherwise Òseems to fly in the face of the realities of the modern worldÓ (Benhabib, 2003: 165) . Europe by creating a common market for the crucial resources necessary for war. Arendt never mentions the EEC in her published work. However, it is clear from her correspondence that she did support the creation of its earlier incarnation, the ECSC. In a letter to Jaspers from May 1958, Arendt wrote, ÒI canÕt write about Europe yet.
[É] This is a totally god forsaken place except for the presence of the Coal and Steel CommunityÓ (in Kohler and Saner, 1993: 351) .
Although these statements are somewhat ambiguous, they suggest that Arendt thought that a certain degree of integration in Europe was a step in the right direction after 1945. Lars Rensmann (2006: 160, 146) ArendtÕs (1994a: 416-7) endorsement of the Òvery healthy and necessary efforts to federate the European nationsÓ also fits with her broader desire to undermine ideas of absolute state sovereignty. Writing after the war, she notes, ÒIf men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounceÓ (Arendt, 1977b: 165) . Although there is much debate about how to classify the EU and over how much power it actually wields, it is clear that is has indeed succeeded Òshak[ing] the state concept and its sovereigntyÓ (Arendt, 1969: 231) . From this perspective, it is not the contents or actual operations of the EU that are crucial, but the mere fact that the European movement sought to take up the past as a resource to generate a Ònew beginning,Ó a new form of Òaction in concertÓ that has the potential to give birth to a new form of politics that preserving plurality and natality in the postwar world. Òunmasterable pastÓ (Maier, 1988) and EuropeÕs broader legacy of war and atrocity.
Concluding Remarks
In considering the continued imperative for change emanating from EuropeÕs experience of total war, I have examined the reflections of two of GermanyÕs leading postwar political theorists and public intellectuals, Hannah Arendt and JŸrgen Habermas.
Focusing on so much on Germany may seem narrow, but is justifiable given its central place in the violence of atrocities of the twentieth century and the indispensible role it has played in the origins and development of the EU since 1945. More than any other country, the Federal Republic has sought to memorialize and atone for its past.
West GermanyÕs intellectual, political and societal confrontation with its history is even reflected in its language. Since 1945 the German language has developed two distinct words to describe the process of dealing with a less than glorious past. The first, Geschichtsaufarbeitung, refers to the attempt to Òcome to terms with history.Ó The second, VergangenheitsbewŠltigung, emphasizes the need to master or overcome the past (McCarthy, 2002) . This term can even be read as ÒfightingÓ the past, as the verb bewŠltigen comes from the Middle High German word for violence (Gewalt).
The need to confront its own history has taken on such importance in postwar West
Germany that even these terms have become politicized. Theodor Adorno (1986) Republic to commit itself fully to the European project as a way of putting its history of bloody nationalism firmly into the past.
At the start of the second millennium, the imperative for change arising from the events of the first half of the twentieth century has started to wane. There are two main reasons for this decline in the motivational power of memory as an imperative for change. The first has to do with the important challenge that the fall of communism in 1989 and the integration of the new member-states from East-Central Europe has posed for European memory culture. Whereas Western Europe has followed Germany in treating the Holocaust as Òthe European entry ticketÓ (Judt, 2005: 803) , collective memories on the eastern side of the iron curtain emphasize the experience of communism Òas the main evil by way of duration and intensityÓ (Kattago, 2009: 382) Internal European divisions over memory signal the EUÕs failure to develop a coherent, critical Òculture of rememberingÓ that allows for diversity within a shared, European commitment to confront and learn from the past (see Prutsch, 2013) . However, this lack of unity is only part of the problem. Perhaps even more important is the fact that the generations that experienced and carried personal memories of EuropeÕs age of total war have started to pass away (see Verovšek, 2014a) . Although the EU and its memberstates (both in the east and west) have created countless memorials to both the crimes of fascism and of communism, the shared experience of war and of opposition to totalitarianism as a unified phenomenon that sought to make the individual ÒsuperfluousÓ (Arendt, 2006: 273) has started to fade way.
Insofar as the integration project sprung Òdirectly from [EuropeÕs] unique historical experienceÓ (Kagan, 2004: 55) , the fact that the generations that can directly remember the war are no longer active in public life has become more and more problematic. As the collective memories of EuropeÕs age of total war have faded, so has support for the EU. there is a need for a renewed justification for European integration.Ó From a certain perspective, this is understandable. However, it is also unfortunate.
As a political reality, the EU often falls short of its own goals and the aspirations of its most ardent supporters. However, its shortcomings should not make us forget how revolutionary the attempt to create a postnational Òcommunity of memoryÓ (Assmann, 2007) out of the horrors of war actually was. As I have shown, both Arendt and
Habermas base their support for the European movement on their experience of the war.
As Arendt points out:
Those who emerged to wage war fought against fascism and nothing else. And this is not surprising; what is surprising precisely because of its strict, almost logical consequence is, rather, that all of these movements at once found a positive political slogan which plainly indicated the non-national though very popular character of the new struggle. That slogan was simply EUROPE (Arendt, 1994b: 112) . This is not to say that either of them would wholeheartedly support what the EU has in fact become at the start of the third millennium. Habermas has written extensively on the EU in recent years, arguing that the peoples of Europe must take a greater role in the organizationÕs functions to combat the organizations growing democratic deficit (see Verovšek, 2012) . He (Habermas, 2012) on. However, again similar to Habermas, she would also most likely reject the institutional form this freedom has taken the actual institutional architecture of the EU. In this sense, both thinkers emphasize that the Òinternal connection between law and politics must be acknowledgedÓ (Volk, 2017: 7) . As a result, in addition to drawing on collective memory to bolster support for European integration as an ideal, Arendt and Habermas also draw on the legacy of total war to criticize the EU as an actually existing institution for its reliance on strict legal rules and technocratic arguments.
This Arendto-Habermasian reading of the EU is especially important in light of the ongoing crisis of the Eurozone and the new surge of populism that has followed in its wake. Habermas and Arendt would reject the calls from the nationalist right to dismantling or disembowelment of the EU. If anything, the increasing salience of fascist symbols from the 1930s makes the preservation of the EU as a community of memory that preserves the lessons of EuropeÕs experience of total war all the more necessary and urgent. After all, if Europe abandons the EU, the worldÕs most important Òtheoretical proving-ground of contemporary liberalismÓ (Anderson, 2009: 133) , it may once again end up with a decidedly illiberal form of politics on a continent that ought to remember the dangerous consequences of embracing nationalistic populism. 1 HabermasÕs understanding of the past draws most directly on the work of Adorno, Benjamin and Freud, particularly the latterÕs argument for the necessity of the patient to work through their past in order to deal fully with the present. However, Maurice Halbwachs, who was a student of ƒmile Durkheim, is always in the background as well. Although Habermas cites him only once to my knowledge (see Habermas, 1984: 418) Jay, 1973: 30, 38, 197-8 Adorno, 1994: 618, 623) . This indicates that he knew of Halbwach and his role in ensuring his release, but that they most likely were not personally acquainted. Although it is impossible to say for certain, it is possible that Halbwachs influenced both BenjaminÕs and AdornoÕs understandings of memory, as well that of Habermas, both through the work of his predecessors and his own reading. In contrast to Habermas, however, it is unlikely that Arendt would have been familiar with HalbwachÕs work, as it was only taken up and rediscovered during the Òmemory boomÓ of the 1980s after HalbwachÕs early death of dysentery in Buchenwald in 1945. 2 For Arendt, zōon politikon (ζῷον πολιτικόν in Aristotle) describes man as a political being (ein politisches Lebenswesen). She objects strongly to St. Thomas AquinasÕ translation of this concept as animal socialis, because Òthis unconscious substitution of the social for the political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics has been lostÓ (Arendt, 1998: 23) . 3 This focus on the importance of the common world explains why Arendt originally wanted to give The Human Condition (1958) the title Amor Mundi (Òfor love of the worldÓ). This focus on the construction of a common world that we all share is also at the center of ArendtÕs interpretation of Immanuel Kant and of her importance to her work. Although I am unable to go into these points in detail due to constraints of space, I would like to thank one of the reviewers from this journal for calling my attention to these important points. 4 Unfortunately, I do not have the space to expand on this point here. For more on BenjaminÕs understanding of history and memory, as well as ArendtÕs interpretation and her reflections on his work, see (Benjamin, 1977) . 5 Habermas admits this connection in his essay on Arendt, in (Habermas, 1983: 171-88 ).
